美国对中国的计谋失败了

文/Lulu Papers Dec 29, 2023

美国国防部长Lloyd Austin上周宣布成立“繁荣卫士行动”联盟，以应对伊朗支持的也门胡塞叛军在红海对“与以色列相关”船只的袭击，捍卫“航行自由”。以色列与哈马斯的加沙冲突因此而面临外溢的风险。这有悖于美国专注对华竞争的初衷。拜登政府已明确表示，中国是唯一既有意愿又有能力挑战美国全球霸主地位的对手，而美国将集中力量应对中国挑战。

想要在全球领导权的博弈中获胜，华盛顿可用的一个大手段是让中国以某种方式卷入战争，而自己置身事外。这最符合美国的利益。一战和二战初期美国的熟练经验以及在与前苏联竞争中的朝鲜战争和越南战争教训便是其正反面的例证。

然而，现在放眼望去，人们会发现实际上是美国陷入战斗，而北京则是坐山观虎斗、收渔翁之利。

在乌克兰战场，俄罗斯正扭转局面。普京总统下令轰炸敖德萨港口、封锁乌克兰，而美国及其盟国对泽连斯基政府的支持则明显转弱。

任何有心人都会发现，在莫斯科已被美国为首的联盟全面制裁的情况下，俄罗斯在战场上之所以能够保持韧性，在很大程度上要归功于中国强大的工业实力被动员起来支持它。要看到这一支持的至关重要性，只需留意一下这一数据：两国贸易额在去年年初乌战爆发以来，急升至今年的超过2180亿美元 ——单是今年中国对俄出口就同比上升了50%。

随后，美国发现自己困在了中东。它曾试图从中抽身，“转向东亚”；而哈马斯10月初对以色列的袭击又把它拉了回来，因为它现在声称，为了“民主对独裁”的斗争（对中俄的竞争也使用了这个说法），它别无选择，只能全心全意支持民主的以色列。现在，捍卫红海的“航行自由”口号听起来同样使美国不得不在那里采取行动。

挑动北京卷入代理人战争，以使其像当年的苏联一样“流血和崩溃”——华盛顿应该说是有成算，甚至有朝野共识。然而，美国自身被卷入欧洲和中东战事而北京却像没事儿人一样，这令人吃惊。 

称它为“霸权诅咒”吧 —— 过去几十年来，美国一直是世界上唯一的超级大国，这使得华盛顿很难不把世界重要地区发生的冲突看作它不得不处理的事务，于法于情合当如此。然而，如果把它们加在一起，就会看到耶鲁大学历史学家保罗·肯尼迪（Paul Kennedy）所说的“帝国过度扩张”，他在 1987 年出版的《大国的兴衰》一书中对这一主题进行了著名的探讨。

悖论就在这里。华盛顿深感在已锁定中国为头号问题的情况下，自己火头处处是最糟糕的局面。但似乎事态正向这个方向发展。

在本专栏中，我一直担心华盛顿对中国的持续施压会导致两国之间正在进行的竞争发展为热战，比如，在不远的将来爆发台湾战争——有些人严肃地猜测这会在 2027 或2030 年发生。

然而，11月中旬旧金山举行的中美峰会使人们不禁感觉双方都在认真地宣称，希望确保这场竞争不会演变成冲突，从而使两国之间的战略竞争一直保持和平，直到游戏结束。

现在，在加沙和红海发生的事正带来这一可能性的变种情形：尽管华盛顿在台湾问题上以及最近通过菲律宾在南海问题上挑衅不断，但中国决心不被诱入一场热战，而美国却被各个地区的热点问题缠住，深陷其中而无法自拔。

这是否意味着美国将面临“流血和崩溃”的命运，而北京则坚决超脱于任何地缘政治热点、和平接管世界霸权？

如果你采信国务卿Blinken和国防部长Austin的说法，上述推测可能显得匪夷所思——他们两位都信誓旦旦地声称，同时应对乌克兰、中东和东亚的挑战，美国仍然可以“游刃有余”。

拜登在一次电视采访中被问到以色列和乌克兰的战争是否超出了美国可以同时应对的能力，他更是回答说：“当然不是，我的老天我们可是美国啊，是历史上最强大的国家——不只是全世界最强大的，而是整个历史上世界最强大的。我们可以在兼顾这两场战事的同时，还保持我们的整体国际防务。”

这些论断无疑是充满信心，令人印象深刻。然而，正如我们从肯尼迪教授那本关于帝国过度扩张的书中所看到的，以往那些大国的决策者们在面对严峻现实、悔之晚矣之前，也曾是同样地自信满满。

英文原文

With US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin’s announcement last week of Operation Prosperity Guardian – an alliance to defend “freedom of navigation” from attacks by the Iran-backed Yemeni Houthi rebels on “Israel-linked” ships in the Red Sea – the Israeli-Hamas conflict in Gaza is in danger of a spillover that goes against America’s intention to focus on its rivalry with China.

The Biden administration has made it known that China is the only rival which possesses both the willingness and means to challenge America’s global supremacy and that the US will concentrate its efforts on that challenge.

For Washington to win the game of global leadership, one big way is to manoeuvre so that China gets into a war, one way or another, while the US remains aloof from one itself. This would best serve American interests, as seen from its masterful experiences in the early stages of the first and second world wars, and its sobering experiences during the Korean war and Vietnam war amid its global competition with the former Soviet Union.

Look around, however, and one will see that it is America that is effectively doing the fighting while Beijing looks on from the sidelines and profits from it.

In Ukraine, Russia is turning the corner in its war, with President Vladimir Putin ordering a bombardment of Odesa port, in effect blockading Ukraine, while support for the Zelensky government from America and its allies is losing steam.

As anyone who pays attention will see, Russia’s war efforts have been resilient largely thanks to China’s hefty industrial capabilities, which have been mobilised to shore up a Moscow comprehensively sanctioned by the American-led alliance. For proof of the indispensability of that support, one does not have to look far: trade between the two countries has climbed to a record high of US$218 billion for January to November 2023 – up 26.7 per cent year on year – of which, tellingly, China’s exports to Russia have grown 50 per cent.

Then America found itself stuck in the Middle East, from which it had sought to extricate itself to pivot to East Asia. Attacks by Hamas on Israel in early October pulled the US back in, as it claims it had no choice but to wholeheartedly support fellow democracy Israel. The recent call for the defence of “freedom of navigation” in the Red Sea sounds like an equally compelling case for America to take action there.

Yet there should be no lack of conviction, even consensus, in Washington regarding provoking Beijing into a proxy war, to bleed and collapse it, as happened to the former Soviet Union. That this has not happened while America itself has been dragged into war after war in Europe and the Middle East is a thing of amazement.

Call it the curse of hegemony. America has been the world’s only superpower for the past few decades and this makes it hard for Washington not to see eruptions in key parts of the world as affairs it is compelled to take care of, both legitimately and responsibly. Add them all up, however, and you will see what Yale historian Paul Kennedy calls an “ imperial overstretch”, a theme that his 1987 book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers examines.

Hence the grand paradox. Washington is keenly aware that going “multifocal” is the worst scenario when China is locked in the cross hairs as the issue that really matters. But that seems precisely the direction in which things are now moving.

My concern in this column has been Washington’s relentless leaning on China, which might result in the contest turning hot by, say, a war over Taiwan in a not-too-distant future – be it in 2027 or 2030, as some have seriously conjectured.

Watching the Joe Biden-Xi Jinping summit in San Francisco in mid-November, however, one could not help but feel that both Washington and Beijing were serious in wanting to ensure their contest does not veer into conflict, so that their strategic competition remains peaceful till the end of the game.

What is happening in Gaza and the Red Sea is bringing up a variant version of that possibility. China is determined not to be enticed into a hot war in spite of Washington’s provocation over Taiwan and, lately, over the South China Sea through the Philippines, while America has become entangled in regional hotspots and is finding it difficult not to go deeper into them, never mind get out.

Will that spell a fate of “bleed and collapse” for America while the prospect of Beijing, determinedly detached from any geopolitical flashpoints, peacefully taking over world hegemony is in the offing?

This could be wide of the mark, admittedly, if Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defence Secretary Austin are to be believed. They have both said that America can “walk and chew gum” in dealing with challenges in Ukraine, the Middle East and East Asia simultaneously.

Or, as Biden said in a televised interview when asked if the wars in Israel and Ukraine were more than the US could take on at the same time: “No. We’re the United States of America for God’s sake, the most powerful nation in the history – not in the world, in the history of the world”. He added: “We can take care of both of these and still maintain our overall international defence.”

These assertions certainly impart an impressive sense of confidence. But then so did those of the decision-makers of the great powers of the past, covered by Professor Kennedy’s book on imperial overstretch, before they were confronted with sombre realities.

Terry Su is president of Lulu Derivation Data Ltd, a Hong Kong-based online publishing house and think tank specialising in geopolitics